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Showing posts with label Decisions- Full Text. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Decisions- Full Text. Show all posts

Friday, November 6, 2015

DELHI HIGH COURT

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX Vs VRINDAVAN FARMS (P) LTD.

 ITA Nos. 71/2015, ITA 72/2015, ITA 84/2015
Order Dated.- August 12, 2015

Ratio/Brief Analysis
Where revenue has not doubted the identity of the share applicants,  entire details of the share applicants were made available to the AO  including their PAN numbers, confirmations, their bank statements, their balance sheets and profit and loss accounts and the certificates of incorporation etc. and the AO had not undertaken any investigation of the veracity of the above documents submitted to him, in the Court's  view  the assessee by producing sufficient documentation discharged its initial onus of showing the genuineness and creditworthiness of the share applicants.

DR. S.MURALIDHAR AND MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, JJ.

For The Appellant : Ms Suruchi Aggarwal, Senior Standing Counsel with Ms Lakshmi Gurung, Junior Standing Counsel.
For The Respondent : Mr Ved Jain and Mr Pranjal Srivastava, Advocates.

ORDER
1. These appeals by the Revenue are directed against the common order dated 6th June 2014 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (‘ITAT’) in ITA Nos.3359, 3360 & 3361/Del/2013 for the Assessment Years (‘AY’) 2006-07, 2007-08 and 2008-09 respectively.
2. The common question of law raised by the Revenue is whether the ITAT was justified in upholding the deletion of addition made by the Assessing Officer of ₹ 4,94,50,000/- to the income of the Assessee under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Act)? The said issue in turn required examination of whether the Assessee had discharged the onus of proving the identity and creditworthiness of the share applicants and the genuineness of the transactions.
3. Ms. Suruchi Aggarwal, learned Senior Standing counsel for the Appellant, relied upon the decision of this Court in CIT v. Nova Promoters & Finlease Ltd. 342 ITR 169 and urged that the Assessing Officer (AO) was not required to “point to the source from which the money was received by the Assessee”. On the other hand, it was incumbent upon the Assessee to offer a satisfactory explanation regarding nature and source of the funds.
3. The ITAT has in the impugned order noticed that in the present case the Revenue has not doubted the identity of the share applicants. The sole basis for the Revenue to doubt their creditworthiness was the low income as reflected in their Income Tax Returns. The entire details of the share applicants were made available to the AO by the Assessee. This included their PAN numbers, confirmations, their bank statements, their balance sheets and profit and loss accounts and the certificates of incorporation etc. It was observed by the ITAT that the AO had not undertaken any investigation of the veracity of the above documents submitted to him. It has been righty commented by the ITAT that without doubting the documents, the AO completed the assessment only on the presumption that low return of income was sufficient to doubt the credit worthiness of the share holders.
4. The Court is of the view that the Assessee by produced sufficient documentation discharged its initial onus of showing the genuineness and creditworthiness of the share applicants. It was incumbent to the AO to have undertaken some inquiry and investigation before coming to a conclusion on the issue of creditworthiness. In para 39 of the decision in Nova Promoters (supra), the Court has taken note of a situation where the complete particulars of the share applicants are furnished to the AO and the AO fails to conduct an inquiry. The Court has observed that in that event no addition can be made in the hands of the Assessee under Section 68 of the Act and it will be open to the Revenue to move against the share applicants in accordance with law.
5. In the facts and circumstances of the present appeals, the Court is satisfied that no substantial question of law arises. The appeals are dismissed.

subashagarwal.blogspot.com

Commissioner of Income Tax Vs M/s Relcom

 DELHI HIGH COURT
Commissioner of Income Tax Vs M/s Relcom

Ratio/Brief Analysis
Assessee is entitled  to  TDS credit without offering the corresponding income to taxation.
Court relied upon the well-settled dictum that procedure is the handmaid of justice, and it cannot be used to hamper the cause of justice [Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra v. Pramod Gupta, (2003) 3 SCC 272]. 
IN the instant case, the vendor had billed "REPL", assessee's  sister concern for the work but had mistakenly mentioned assessee’s PAN in the TDS certificate, thus inadvertently crediting its TDS account in the 26AS statement, which is PAN based. 

 ITA No. 26/2015
Order Dated : January 16, 2015



S Ravindra Bhat And R K Gauba, JJ.

For the Appellant : Ms. Suruchii Aggarwal, Adv

For the Respondent : None

ORDER

Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat (Open Court)

1. The revenue has filed the present appeal against the impugned order dated 15.07.2014 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as, "ITAT") in ITA No.5979/DEL/2012, relating to the Assessment Year 2009-10. The question of law urged by the revenue in the instant appeal is:

"Whether in view of Section 199 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the assessee was entitled to the TDS without offering the corresponding income i.e. total receipts of ₹ 19,08,20,903/-to taxation by declaring it as total income?"

2. The facts involved in the present appeal are that during the year under consideration, the respondent (hereinafter referred to as, "the assessee") derived income from the business of erection, commissioning and installation of towers on contract basis. It filed its returns for the relevant assessment year on 29.03.2010 and the returns were processed under Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereafter referred to as, "the Act").The Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that as per Form 26AS statement, though the total receipts declared by the assessee was ₹ 6,20,99,368/- (as opposed to ₹ 19,08,20,903/-), the TDS claimed was ₹ 1,20,73,097/-. The assessee's explanation for the discrepancy was that a vendor had billed M/s Relcom Engineering Pvt. Ltd. ("REPL"), its sister company, for the work but had mistakenly mentioned its (assessee’s) PAN in the TDS certificate, thus inadvertently crediting its TDS account in the 26AS statement, which is PAN based.

3. The assessee had claimed credit of all TDS certificates, including that related to M/s REPL but the income of this certificate was not reflected in the Profit and Loss Account. The total TDS claim made by the assessee was ₹ 1,20,73,097/- against a total of ₹ 19,08,20,903/- received. The assessee stated that the benefit of the TDS certificate mistakenly issued in its PAN name has not been availed by M/s REPL. The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected this claim relying on Section 199 of the Act and held that the TDS credit should be allowed to the person from whose income the deduction was made. Therefore, according to the AO, the assessee, instead of claiming the credit of the TDS which did not belong to it, should have approached the vendors for correction of their record. The AO held that since out of the total receipts of ₹ 19,08,20,903/-, the assessee received only ₹ 6,20,99,368/- (and the rest of the amount was received by Ms/ REPL), the TDS could be claimed only against the said amount of ₹ 6,20,99,368/-.

4. The assessee appealed against the AO’s order before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (hereinafter referred to as, CIT(A)) who, by its order dated 20.09.2012, allowed the TDS claim. The CIT(A) noted that the assessee had categorically stated that the benefit of TDS claimed by it had not been availed by M/s REPL. Thus, the CIT(A) allowed assessee’s claim, on the ground that since the assessee had already paid the due taxes in M/s REPL (both companies being a part of the same group), it would be a travesty of justice to not allow the benefit of TDS to the assessee. The observations of CIT(A) are reproduced below:

"4.2 I have carefully considered the submissions made by the appellant and the assessment order framed by the AO and I am of the considered opinion that there is no technicality involved in the issue and it is purely a matter of applying little bit of common sense. It is clear from the narrations in the preceding paragraphs that there is an apparent mistake on the part of the vendor who has billed M/s. REPL for the work, but has mistakenly mentioned the PAN of M/s. Relcom in the TDS certificate. Thus, the credit of TDS has gone in the account of M/s. Relcom in the 26AS statement, which is PAN based. The appellant found it cumbersome to get fresh corrected certificates from the vendor and to approach the TDS division of the department for necessary rectification in the 26AS statement. Instead, the group decided that both the concerns belong to the same group and it would be easier to claim refund in M/s. Relcom and pay the due taxes in M/s. REPL. This is exactly what has transpired. Since, the appellant has already paid the due taxes in M/s. REPL, it would be a travesty of justice to not allow the benefit of TDS in M/s. Relcom. Therefore, the AO is directed to allow the benefit of TDS claim of the appellant as per the TDS certificates submitted by it…"

The ITAT, by its impugned order dated 15.07.2014, dismissed the revenue’s appeal against the order of the CIT(A).

5. The revenue in the present appeal has urged that the CIT(A) and the ITAT could not have allowed the entire TDS amount of ₹ 1,20,73,097/- claimed by the assessee as the deduction was not made in respect of the assessee’s income and it was, instead, made in respect of M/s REPL’s income. In support of this contention, the revenue relies on the provisions of Section 199 of the Act. The revenue also contended that in the absence of the assessee offering the corresponding income, i.e. total receipts of ₹ 19,08,20,903/- for taxation by declaring total income, the assessee’s TDS claim could not have been allowed. Thus, the revenue submits, the defective TDS amount of ₹ 93,72,097/- should be disallowed and the only legitimate claim is that of ₹ 27,01,000/- against the declared total receipts of ₹ 6,20,99,368/-.

6. Having heard the submissions made on behalf of the revenue and after a perusal the orders passed by the CIT(A) and the ITAT, we are of opinion that the said orders do not call for any interference and were warranted and justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. Before we proceed to elaborate on our reasons for the same, a perusal of Section 199 of the Act is necessary. Section 199 reads as follows:

"199. Credit for tax deducted.

(1) Any deduction made in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Chapter and paid to the Central Government shall be treated as a payment of tax on behalf of the person from whose income the deduction was made, or of the owner of the security, or of the depositor or of the owner of property or of the unit-holder, or of the shareholder, as the case may be.

(2) Any sum referred to in sub-section (1A) of section 192 and paid to the Central Government shall be treated as the tax paid on behalf of the person in respect of whose income such payment of tax has been made.

(3) The Board may, for the purposes of giving credit in respect of tax deducted or tax paid in terms of the provisions of this Chapter, make such rules as may be necessary, including the rules for the purposes of giving credit to a person other than those referred to in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) and also the assessment year for which such credit may be given."

7. The revenue relies on the phrase "shall be treated as a payment of tax on behalf of the person from whose income the deduction was made" to contend that the assessee’s TDS claim cannot be based on the receipts of M/s REPL. However, the assessee fairly admitted throughout the proceedings for its TDS claim of ₹ 1,20,73,097/- that the benefit of such claim has not been availed by M/s. REPL. Therefore, the revenue, having assessed M/s REPL’s income in respect to such TDS claim cannot now deny the assessee’s claim on the mere technical ground that the income in respect of the said TDS claim was not that of the assessee, given that M/s Relcom (the assessee) and M/s REPL are sister concerns and M/s REPL has not raised any objection with regard to the assessee’s TDS claim of ₹ 1,20,73,097/-.

8. This Court’s reasoning is supported by a ruling of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT v. Bhooratnam, (2013) 357 ITR 196 (AP), where the Court noted as follows:

"In our view, the CIT (Appeals) and the Tribunal have rightly held that the assessee is entitled to the credit of the TDS mentioned in the TDS certificates issued by the contractor, whether the said certificate is issued in the name of the Joint Venture or in the name of a Director of the assessee company. They have considered the terms of the agreement dated 12-03- 2003 among the parties to the joint venture and held that credit for TDS certificates cannot be denied to the assessee while assessing the contract receipts mentioned in the said certificates as income of the assessee. The income shown in the TDS certificates has either to be taxed in the hands of the joint venture or in the hands of the individual co-joint venturer. As the joint venture has not filed return of income and claimed credit for TDS certificates and the TDS certificates have not been doubted, credit has to be granted to the TDS mentioned therein for the assessee.

XXX XXX XXX

The Revenue cannot be allowed to retain tax deducted at source without credit being available to anybody. If credit of tax is not allowed to the assessee, and the joint venture has not filed a return of income, then credit of the TDS cannot be taken by anybody. This is not the spirit and intention of law."

(emphasis supplied)

9. At this stage, it is also relevant to note the provisions of Rule 37BA of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, which envisions grant of TDS credit to entities other than the deductee (herein, M/s REPL). We must clarify that we are not oblivious of the fact that Rule 37BA is not directly applicable in the facts of this case. The reliance placed on Rule 37BA is merely to demonstrate that in not all circumstances is TDS credit given to the deductee.

10. This Court relies upon the well-settled dictum that procedure is the handmaid of justice, and it cannot be used to hamper the cause of justice [Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra v. Pramod Gupta, (2003) 3 SCC 272]. Therefore, the revenue’s contention that the assessee, instead of claiming the entire TDS amount, ought to have sought a correction of the vendor’s mistake, would unnecessarily prolong the entire process of seeking refund based on TDS credit.

11. In light of the aforesaid reasons, the question of law framed is answered against the revenue and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

subashagarwal.blogspot.com

Saturday, October 10, 2015

Commissioner of Income-tax v. Pact Securities & Financial Services Ltd.

HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND TELANGANA

Commissioner of Income-tax v. Pact Securities & Financial Services Ltd.
61 taxmann.com 192
I.T.T.A. NOS. 252 & 291 OF 2003, 132 & 136 OF 2004 AND 76 & 77 OF 2006
Order Dated.-  FEBRUARY  5, 2015

Ratio/Brief Analysis
Where assessee had maintained accounts as per guidance note on accounting for leases issued by ICAI and during the year it had claimed deduction of lease equalisation charges from lease rental income, the AO cannot discard the method of accounting following by assessee . The 'a' was entitled to deduction inspite of the fact that guidance note has not attained mandatory status.

Full Text
Dilip B. Bhosale and A. Ramalingeswara Rao

For the Appellant: S.R. Ashok and K.K. Viswanatham 
For the Respondent: Y. Ratnakar and S. Sasidhar Reddy, Standing Counsel

ORDER
Dilip B. Bhosale
The first four appeals, under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short "the Act"), are preferred by the Revenue. Out of which, first two appeals are against the orders dated July 30, 2002, and November 29, 2002, in I.T.A. Nos. 142/Hyd/2002 and 141/Hyd/2002, respectively, and the remaining two are against the common order dated March 26, 2002, rendered by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in Income Tax Appeal bearing No. 229/Hyd/2000 and 273/Hyd/2000. By these orders, the Tribunal allowed the Income Tax Appeals filed by the respondent-assessee against the orders of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) dated December 10, 2001, December 14, 2001, and January 28, 2000. In so far as I.T.A. No. 273/Hyd/2000 is concerned, that was also disposed of by the order dated January 28, 2000, along with the assessee's appeal bearing I.T.A. No. 229/Hyd/2000. All these appeals pertain to the assessment years 1996-97 to 1999-2000.
2. Before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), the assessees had called in question the orders of Assessing Officer (for short "the AO"), who, while completing the assessment for the relevant assessment years disallowed the deduction of the "lease equalisation" charges from the lease rental income. The disallowed amounts by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in these appeals are of Rs. 48,56,224, Rs. 44,18,245 and Rs. 13,16,123.
3. Since the questions raised and the assessee in all four appeals are common, for the sake of convenience we state the facts leading to I.T.T.A. No. 252 of 2003 preferred by the Revenue, to the extent they are necessary, as follows : the assessee-company had filed its return of income on November 30, 1998, declaring the income of Rs. 58,65,660. The return was processed under section 143(1)(a) of the Act on September 28, 1999, without any adjustments. Then the assessee's case was selected for scrutiny by issue of a notice under section 143(2) dated September 28, 1999. The notice was served on the assessee on October 11, 1999. Subsequently, notices under section 142(1) and 143(2) were issued, in response to which, chartered accountant of the assessee appeared before the Assessing Officer and furnished details called for. The assessment was then completed and the Assessing Officer disallowed the lease equalisation charges of Rs. 48,56,224 from the lease rental charges for the assessment year 1998-99.
3.1 During the assessment year 1998-99, the assessee had given certain assets on lease and shown gross lease rentals of Rs. 1,14,91,395, as income in the profit and loss account. Out of this, a sum of Rs. 48,56,224 was claimed as deduction by way of "lease equalisation charges" from the lease rental income. In the course of assessment proceedings, it was submitted on behalf of the assessee that the treatment in the accounts had been given as per the "guidance note" on accounting for leases, issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (for short "the ICAI"). In this backdrop, the question that was considered by the Tribunal and Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was whether the assessee could take recourse to the "guidance note" issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India qua accounting for lease in determination of its income, and whether the deduction as claimed by the assessee ought to be allowed.
4. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) disallowed the "lease equalisation" charges from the lease rental income, whereas the Tribunal allowed and, hence, the Revenue preferred the above four appeals raising five questions of law in the memorandum of appeals. At the stage of admitting the appeals no substantial question of law was framed. In view thereof, learned senior counsel for the Revenue, fairly submitted that only the following substantial question of law, in their appeals, arise for our consideration :
"(1) whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in allowing the assessee to deduct the lease equalisation charges from the lease rental income, accepting its accounting policy based on the guidance note issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India for preparation of accounts and whether it would override the statutory provisions of the Act ?"
5. The remaining two appeals, bearing I.T.T.A. Nos. 132 and 136 of 2004, preferred by the assessees, are against the orders passed by all the three authorities, disallowing the deduction of "lease equalisation charges" from the gross lease receipts, holding that the assessee was in the wrong in employing the "guidance note" issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India for computing their income from lease rent. In these appeals, the following substantial question of law is raised for our consideration :
"(1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in disallowing deduction of lease equalisation charges from the gross lease receipts ?"
6. Counsel for the assessees, at the outset, invited our attention to the judgments of the Delhi High Court in CIT v. Virtual Soft Systems Ltd. [2012] 341 ITR 593/205 Taxman 257/18 taxmann.com 119 and of the Karnataka High Court in Prakash Leasing Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2012] 208 Taxman 464/23 taxmann.com 3 and contended that similar questions fell for consideration of these High Courts and based on the guidance note issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India held that the assessees are entitled for deduction of lease equalisation charges from lease receipts. In short, it was contended that the questions raised in these appeals are squarely covered by those judgments. It was further submitted that the assessee is entitled to have its accounting policy taking recourse to the guidance note issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, while accounting for lease transactions. It was further submitted that the courts have accepted the recommendations issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India from time to time, with respect to the manner and mode of reflecting transactions in books of account, in number of judgments pronounced by High Courts as well as the Supreme Court. Lastly, he submitted that what is provided in the guidance note stands transacted into an accounting standard issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and approved under sub-section (2) of section 145 of the Act by the Central Government.
7. Mr. S.R. Ashok, learned senior counsel appearing for the Revenue, on the other hand, at the outset, invited our attention to section 145 of the Act, in particular sub-section (2) thereof, and submitted that neither the accounting standards nor the guidance note issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India could be taken recourse to in the absence of a notification being issued by the Central Government as contemplated by sub-section (2). He submitted that the Delhi High Court and the Karnataka High Court did not consider the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 145 of the Act in proper perspective, and without reference thereto considered whether the guidance note could be the basis for accepting the accounting system followed by the assessee. He submitted that the taxable income of the assessee should be determined as per the Income-tax Act and not on the basis of the guidance note issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. In other words, it was submitted that the assessee cannot take recourse to the guidance note issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India qua accounting for lease in determination of its income and, therefore, in that regard whether a particular deduction ought to be allowed or disallowed, one should only have to look to the provisions of the Income-tax Act.
8. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties were centered around the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Virtual Soft Systems Ltd.case (supra) and of the Karnataka High Court in Prakash Leasing Ltd. case (supra) and also the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 145 of the Income-tax Act. In view thereof, we would like to have a glance at both the judgments and the provisions of section 145(2) of the Income-tax Act.
8.1 In Virtual Soft Systems Ltd. (supra), the following questions were framed (page 599 of 341 ITR):
"(1) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal erred in law and on the merits in allowing the deduction of the lease equalisation charges from the lease rental income?
(2) Whether the guidance note issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India for presentation of accounts would override the statutory provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961?"
8.2 The facts leading to the appeal before the Delhi High Court were almost similar, in the sense the assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1996-97 was set aside by the Commissioner directing the Assessing Officer to include the assessee's lease rental income. For the assessment years 1997-98 to 2000-01, the assessments were reopened by the Assessing Officer and he came to the conclusion that the taxable income of the assessee had to be determined in accordance with the Act and not on the basis of the guidance note, which only provided guidelines for preparation of financial statements for the purpose of accounting. The Assessing Officer, accordingly, disallowed the sum attributed to lease equalisation charges, and, consequently, added to the assessee's income. The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer, whereas the Tribunal allowed the appeals of the assessee on the merits. In this backdrop, the relevant observations made by Delhi High Court in Virtual Soft Systems Ltd. (supra) read thus (page 602 of 341 ITR):
"In this background what is required to be considered is whether the books of account could be rejected by the Assessing Officer merely for the reason that recourse to the guidance note was taken by the assessee. In this regard, we would be required to examine the provisions of section 145 of the Income-tax Act. Section 145 of the Income-tax Act adverts to the method of accounting followed by an assessee. Sub-section (1) of section 145 provides that income chargeable under the head 'Profits and gains of business or profession' or 'Income from other sources' shall be computed either on the cash basis or on the mercantile system, whichever method being regularly employed by the assessee. This provision is, however, subject to the Central Government notifying accounting standard in respect of any class of assessee or class of income. Sub-section (3) of section 145 empowers the Assessing Officer to disregard the books of account submitted by the assessee only if he is not satisfied with the correctness or completeness of the accounts of the assessee or the method of accounting employed by the assessee or on account of the accounting standards notified under sub-section (2), not being particularly followed by the assessee. In this particular case, the Assessing Officer has disregarded, in substance, the method of accounting followed by the assessee qua lease rentals without basing it on the grounds provided in section 145 of the Income-tax Act. The fact that the assessee justified its method of accounting, by taking recourse to the guidance note issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India in that behalf, was disregarded, on what we would term as, a disjointed reading of the provisions of the said guidance note. Both the Assessing Officer as well as the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) have adverted to paragraph 2 of the guidance note to come to what we consider an erroneous conclusion inasmuch as they have held that in determining as to whether deduction on account of the lease equalisation charges ought to be allowed or not, what has to be borne in mind is ultimately the provisions of the Income-tax Act. In our view, such an observation in paragraph 2 of the guidance note is really saying the obvious. Therefore, even if this guidance note was silent on this aspect the provisions of the Income-tax Act would undoubtedly still apply. Thus, as to what is the impact of the provision of paragraph 2 of the guidance note will be considered by us as we progress further with our judgment.
9.1 However, what is important at this stage is to first address ourselves to the aspect as to whether the Assessing Officer could have disregarded the method of accounting followed by the assessee in respect of the lease rentals. In our view, the Assessing Officer could not have done so, as the method of accounting was based on a guideline commended for adoption by a professional body such as the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. The guidance note reflects the best practices adopted by accountants the world over. The fact that, at the relevant point in time, it was not mandatory to adopt the methodology professed by the guidance note issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India is irrelevant for the reason that, as long as there was a disclosure of the change in the accounting policy in the accounts, which had a backing of a professional body such as the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, it could not be discarded by the Assessing Officer. This is specially so, since the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India is recognised as the body vested with the authority to recommend accounting standards for ultimate prescription by the Central Government in consultation by the National Advisory Committee of Accounting Standards, for presentation of financial statements. The provisions of section 211(3C) of the Companies Act, 1956, are quite clear on this aspect. As a matter of fact, the proviso to the said sub-section, quite clearly specifies that till such time the Central Government prescribes the accounting standards the accounting standards issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India shall be deemed to be the relevant accounting standards. The relevant provision reads as follows:
'211. (3C) For the purposes of this section, the expression "accounting standards" means the standards of accounting, recommended by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India constituted under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 (38 of 1949), as may be prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with the National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards established under sub-section (1) of section 201A:
Provided that the standards of accounting specified by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India shall be deemed to be the accounting standards until the accounting standards are prescribed by the Central Government under this sub-section.'
In this context, it would be important to note that Accounting Standard 1 pertaining to disclosure of accounting policies has already been notified by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India as having attained mandatory status for periods commencing on or after April 1, 1991. It is not the Assessing Officer's case that the accounting policy with regard to the lease rentals was not disclosed by the assessee. The Assessing Officer seems to have taken umbrage to the change in the accounting policy having been brought about only with effect from the assessment year 1996-97. In our view, as long as there was a disclosure of the factum of change in the accounting policy and its effect in the accounts no fault could be found with the change in the accounting policy merely on account of the fact that it was employed for the first time in the assessment year 1996-97. The change in the accounting policy, as noticed by us above, had the imprimatur of a duly recognised professional body, i.e., the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the opinion of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India was expressed in a guidance note which had not attained a mandatory status, would not, in our view, provide a basis to the Assessing Officer to disregard the books of account of the assessee and in effect method of accounting for leases followed by the assessee."
8.3 The Karnataka High Court, in Prakash Leasing Ltd. (supra) framed the following questions of law:
"1.

Whether in law the Tribunal was justified in confirming the disallowance made by the lower authorities on the claim of the appellant with regard to the lease equalisation account to the extent of Rs. 4,35,89,466 ?
2.

Whether in law the Tribunal is justified in not appreciating that the appellant being a NBFC had followed the norms required by its regulatory authority, namely, RBI and hence the claim made by the appellant with regard to the lease equalisation account was perfectly in order?
3.

Whether in law the Tribunal was justified in declining to accept the deduction claimed by the appellant which was in accordance with accounting standard which was consistently followed which declares the real income in the relevant year?
4.

Whether in law the Tribunal was justified in concluding that lease equalisation reserve is an appropriation of profit and thus cannot be allowed as deduction?"
8.4 The Karnataka High Court considered several judgments including the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Virtual Soft Systems Ltd. (supra) and in paragraph 12, observed thus:
"Admittedly, in so far as the lease equalisation charges are concerned, it is not provided in the notified accounting standards by the Department. It is also not in dispute that in the Act what the lease equalisation charges is not explained. In the absence of any specific provision in the Act dealing on the subject, when the accounting standard is now made the basis for maintaining the accounts for the purpose of income-tax, even if the Central Government has not notified in the Official Gazette the accounting standards, certainly the accounting standards prescribed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants has to be followed. In fact, the hon'ble Supreme Court in Challapalli Sugars Ltd. v. CIT [1975] 98 ITR 167 (SC) has put its seal of approval on adopting the accounting standards while interpreting section 10(2)(vi), (via), (vib) and section 10(5) of the Indian Income-tax Act 1922, while interpreting the expression 'actual cost'. The Supreme Court held in (ITR page 173) : 'as the expression "actual cost" has not been defined, it should, in, our opinion, be construed in the sense which no commercial man would misunderstand. For this purpose, it would be necessary to ascertain the connotation of the above expression in accordance with the normal rules of accountancy prevailing in commerce and industry. Therefore, it is judicially accepted that when determining whether there has in fact been accrual of liability or income, the accountancy standards prescribed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India would have to be followed and applied'. Therefore, the reasoning of the authorities though the claim of the assessee is based on such accounting standards of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India while deciding whether receipt of money is taxable or not it has to be decided in accordance with the provisions of law and not in accordance with the accounting practice has no substance as there is no inconsistency between the said accounting practice and any provisions of the Act."
9. We would now like to consider the provisions of section 145 of the Act. Section 145 deals with method of accounting. This provision was substituted by the Finance Act, 1995, with effect from April 1, 1997. In the present case, we are concerned with the assessment years 1997-98 to 2000-01. Sub-section (1) of section 145 states that income chargeable under the head "Profits and gains of business or profession" or "Income from other sources" shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. Sub-section (2) provides that the Central Government may notify in the Official Gazette from time to time "accounting standards" to be followed by any class of assessees or in respect of any class of income. Sub-section (3) of section 145 of the Act provides where the Assessing Officer is not satisfied about the correctness or completeness of the accounts of the assessee, or where the method of accounting provided in sub-section (1), or accounting standards as notified under sub-section (2), have not been regularly followed by the assessee, the Assessing Officer may make an assessment in the manner provided in section 144 of the Act.
10. On the basis of the provisions contained in section 145 of the Act, it was submitted on behalf of the Revenue that the taxable income of the assessee should be determined as per the Act and that the "guidance note" issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India cannot be the basis for such determination. It was further submitted that the guidance note or the accounting standards prescribed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India cannot be taken recourse to or taken into account unless the Central Government notify such accounting standards in the Official Gazette to be followed by any class of assessees or in respect of any class of income. Then, it was submitted that the word "may" in sub-section (2) should be read as "shall" having regard to the scheme of section 145 of the Act. In other words, it was submitted that under any circumstances, the accounting standards or guidance note issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India cannot be taken recourse to while accounting for lease transactions unless the accounting standard is notified in the Official Gazette by the Central Government.
11. In the present case, at the relevant time, the accounting standard employed by the assessee was not notified though it was subsequently notified by the Central Government. We would, therefore, like to examine the question on the premise that at the relevant time the accounting standards employed by the assessees in the present case was not notified by the Central Government.
12. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India's publication on the subject indicates that the "guidance note" on accounting leases was issued by it, for the first time, in 1988, which was then revised in 1995. On April 1, 2001, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India did publish Accounting Standard 19 in respect of leases. It is not in dispute that the said Accounting Standard 19 is applicable in respect of assets leased during accounting periods commencing on or after April 1, 2001. The assessment years, which are under consideration, in these appeals are prior to April 1, 2001. We are not entering into the details as to how the accounting standards work or applied in respect of lease income since the question that falls for our consideration is whether the assessees in these appeals were obliged to employ or to take recourse to guidance note issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India on accounting for leases even though the accounting standard was not notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette as contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 145 of the Act. It is not in dispute that the guidance note reflects the best practices adopted by the accountants in India. Further, it cannot be disputed that the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India is the authority to recommend accounting standards for ultimate prescription by the Central Government in consultation by the National Advisory Committee of Accounting Standards, for presentation of financial statements. In support, as observed by the Delhi High Court in Virtual Soft Systems Ltd. (supra) the provisions of section 211(3C) of the Companies Act are quite clear. The proviso to this section clearly specifies that till such time the Central Government prescribes the accounting standards issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India shall be deemed to be the relevant accounting standards. It is not in dispute that the Accounting Standard 19 prescribed on April 1, 2001, in respect of leases and the accounting standard incorporated in the guidance note is one and the same. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the opinion of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India was expressed in a guidance note which had not attained a mandatory status, would not, in our view, provide a basis to the Assessing Officer to disregard the books of account of the assessee and in effect the method of accounting for leases followed by the assessee as observed by the Delhi High Court in Virtual Soft Systems Ltd. (supra). In this connection, we would like to make a reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Bilahari Investment (P.) Ltd. [2008] 299 ITR 1/168 Taxman 95 wherein it was observed that every assessee is entitled to arrange its affairs and follow the method of accounting, which the Department has earlier accepted. It is only in those cases where the Department records a finding that the method adopted by the assessee results in distortion of profits that the Department can insist on substitution of the existing method. Therefore, certainly the method adopted by the assessee in maintaining its accounts for the earlier period is an important factor, which the authorities have to keep in mind at the time of framing the assessment orders. It is well settled that in determining whether there has in fact been accrual of liability or income, the accountancy standards prescribed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India would have to be followed and applied (see Challapalli Sugars Ltd. v. CIT [1975] 98 ITR 167 (SC). In this judgment, the Supreme Court has put its seal of approval on adopting the accounting standards while interpreting section 10(2)(vi), (via), (vib) and section 10(5) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and the expression "actual cost". Thus, even if at the relevant time, it was not mandatory to adopt the methodology prescribed by the guidance note or for that matter the accounting standard as it was not notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette, in our opinion, it is not relevant for the reason that, as long as there was a disclosure of the accounting policy in the accounts, which had a backing of a professional body, such as the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, it could not be discarded by the Assessing Officer.
13. Lastly, we would like to consider the submission that the word "may" employed in sub-section (2) of section 145 of the Act should be read as "shall". Sub-section (2) provides that the Central Government "may" notify in the Official Gazette from time to time accounting standards to be followed by any class of assessees or in respect of any class of income. The question, therefore, is whether in the absence of such notification, being issued by the Central Government, the accounting standards or the guidance note, prescribing the accounting standards, issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India could be adopted as a method for accounting. It is judicially accepted that in determining whether there has in fact been accrual of liability or income, the accountancy standards prescribed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India would have to be followed and applied. In other words, the accounting standards prescribed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India has received recognition in several decisions of the High Courts and the Supreme Court. We have also made reference to the provisions of section 211(3C) of the Companies Act, 1956. The proviso to this section clearly specifies that till such time the Central Government prescribes, the accounting standards issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India shall be deemed to be the relevant accounting standards. Keeping that in view, it would not be possible to read the word "may" employed in sub-section (2) of section 145 of the Act as "shall". It is well settled that the word "may" normally indicate that the provision is not mandatory. It is also true that the word "may" can also be used in the sense "shall" or "must" by the Legislature. The intent of the Legislature, however, will have to be gathered from the scheme of the relevant provision, Chapter or the relevant statute and also judicial pronouncements dealing with the relevant provision. Having regard to the provisions contained in section 145 of the Act, we are of the opinion that the word "may" used in sub-section (2) thereof cannot be read as "shall". Merely because, the Central Government has not notified in the Official Gazette "accounting standards" to be followed by any class of assessees or in respect of any class of income, it cannot be stated that the "accounting standards" prescribed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India or the accounting standards reflected in the "guidance note" cannot be adopted as an accounting method by an assessee. Thus, this submission also deserves to be rejected.
14. Therefore, in our opinion, notwithstanding the fact that the opinion of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India was expressed in the guidance note, which had not attained a mandatory status, would not, in our view, be a ground to discard the books of account of the assessee or method of accounting for lease followed by the assessee and disallowing the assessee to deduct the lease equalisation charges from the lease rental income.
15. Thus, substantial questions of law framed by us are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The first four (4) appeals filed by the Revenue are accordingly dismissed and the remaining two (2) appeals filed by the assessee are allowed with no order as to costs.
16. Miscellaneous petitions pending in the appeals, if any, also stand disposed of.
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Aranyashwar Devalaya Trust Versus CIT-1, Pune

ITAT PUNE
Aranyashwar Devalaya Trust Versus CIT-1, Pune

No.- ITA No.1489/PN/2013

Dated.- August 17, 2015

Ratio/Brief Analysis
Maintenance of a temple does not amount to propagation of any particular religion as the temple is open for everyone irrespective of religion, caste, creed or sect. Approval u/s 80 G cannot be denied.

SHRI R.K. PANDA AND SHRI VIKAS AWASTHY, JJ.

For The Appellant : Smt. Deepa Khare and Shri D.Y. Pandit

For The Department : Shri A.K. Modi

ORDER

PER R.K. PANDA, AM :
This appeal filed by the assessee is directed against the order dated 10-05-2013 of the CIT-I, Pune rejecting the request for grant of approval u/s.80G of the Income-Tax Act, 1961.
2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that the assessee trust vide an application in Form No.10G requested for grant of approval u/s.80G of the I. T. Act. The assessee trust had been registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 vide an order dated 28-10-1952 and also registered u/s.12A of the I. T. Act vide certificate of registration issued by the CIT-II, Pune on 27-09-2009. It may be pertinent to mention that the assessee trust had never applied for approval u/s.80G prior to making the said application.
3. The Ld. CIT after receiving the application in Form No.10G asked the assessee to explain as to why its request for approval u/s.80G should not be rejected since its objects as well as activities are predominantly religious and since the religious expenses in all the 3 years in respect of which statement of accounts have been submitted exceeded 5% of the total income/receipts which is violative of the provisions of sub-section (5B) of section 80G of the I. T. Act.
4. The assessee filed the statement of accounts for the year ended 31-03-2012, the details of donations received during the said year, copy of change report submitted in the office of the Charity Commissioner etc. It was submitted that the main objects of the assessee trust are to maintain the temple of Lord Aranyeshwar which is owned by the Government of Maharashtra, to perform pooja of the Lord and to celebrate various utsavs. The Ld. CIT noted that the trust deed has a few charitable objects too. However, the main sources of income of the applicant trust are poojas and utsavas and the net income is used for maintenance of the temple building.
5. On being confronted by the Ld. CIT it was submitted that the religious expenses during the year ended 31-03-2010, 31-03-2011 and 31-03-2012 were in excess of the 5% of the total receipts is prima-facie correct, however, the religious expenses would not exceed 5% if the honorarium given to the Brahmins is excluded. Without prejudice to the above, it was further argued that the applicant trust does not pertain to any particular sect and the temple is open for everyone irrespective of religion, caste, creed or sex. The decision of the Panaji Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Shri Gurudev Ranade Samadhi Trust Vs. CIT, Belgaum vide ITA No.155/PNJ/2011 order dated 24-12-2012 was relied upon in which it has been held that Hindu is neither a religion nor a community and construction of temple cannot be regarded as a religious activity.
6. However, the Ld. CIT was not satisfied with the arguments advanced by the assessee and rejected the application seeking approval u/s.80G(5) by observing as under :
“4. After carefully considered the submissions made by the applicant during the course of the present proceedings, the subject application in Form No.10G is disposed of as under :-
4.1 The applicant has fairly accepted that the religious / Pooja expenses incurred by it during the three years under consideration have been in excess of 5% of the total receipts of the concerned years. However, the applicant has sought to make out a case that the honorarium paid to the Brahmins should be excluded. I am afraid, the plea thus raised by the applicant is devoid of merit. It cannot be gainsaid that honorarium is paid to the Brahmins for performing the Poojas and other related activities. In the circumstances, the honorarium thus paid cannot be disassociated from the corresponding activities; hence would partake of the colour of the religious. For the same reason, and as the religious expenses in all three years far exceed 5% of the total receipts of each year, there is clear contravention of the provisions of subsection (5B) of section 80G. As a result, the applicant Trust is not entitled to the benefit of approval u/s.80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It may be pertinent to mention here that while in its reply the applicant has taken into consideration only the Pooja expenses, the other expenses shown as incurred on the objects of the Trust would also have to be considered as religious expenses for the purpose of sub-section (5B) of section 80G inasmuch as the activities of the applicant trust during the years under consideration have been exclusively religious only.
5. Reference has been already made to the applicant's reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Tribunal in the case of Shri Gurudev Ranade Samadhi Trust Vs. CIT, Belgaum. I am afraid, the above reliance is a misplaced one. In the cited case the assessee had not carried out any religious activity. It also did not have any temple. Its objects were to commemorate the sacred memory of Shri Gurudev Ranade and to spread his spiritual teachings by publishing articles and books, by arranging lectures and seminars etc. Thus, the facts in the cited case were fully different from the facts in the present case. Hence, the cited decision would not apply.
6. For the detailed reasons stated hereinabove, and in particulars as the applicant trust has contravened the provisions of sub-section (5B) of section 80G of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, its application in Form No.10G seeking approval u/s.80G(5) is hereby rejected.”
7. Aggrieved with such order of the CIT the Assessee is in appeal before us with the following grounds :
“1. The Ld. CIT erred in rejecting the assessees application for Grant of approval u/s.80G of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
2. Reasons assigned for rejection are wrong, insufficient and contrary to Law & facts.
3. The applicant may be permitted to amend or alter any of the above grounds of appeal or add a new ground of appeal any time before the hearing of appeal or during the course of hearing of appeal.”
8. The Ld. Counsel for the assessee strongly opposed the order of the Ld. CIT. She submitted that the assessee is not a religious trust at all and the assessee does not propagate any particular religion. Referring to the decision of the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of Umaid Charitable Trust Vs. Union of India and others reported in 307 ITR 226 she submitted that the Hon’ble High Court in the said decision has held that Hinduism is not one particular religion. Referring to the order of the CIT she submitted that the CIT has not brought anything on record to show that the assessee is propagating any religion. Referring to the decision of the Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Christian Medical College, Ludhiana Society Vs. CIT vide ITA No.620/Chd/12 reported in 157 TTJ 83, a copy of which is placed in the paper book at page 8 she submitted that the Tribunal in the said decision has allowed grant of approval u/s.80G(5) to society which was established and run by a minority Christian community where the aim and object of the assessee society was to train professionals in the field of medical and health care in the spirit of Jesus Christ and to provide medical facilities in their hospitals to all persons of any caste, creed, race, religion etc. In her alternate contention, the Ld. Counsel for the assessee referred to page 10 of the paper book which was addressed to the ITO, Technical vide letter dated 23-03-2013 and drew the attention of the Bench to the following chart of actual pooja expenses for last 3 years :
Sr.No.
Asst. Year
Total Receipts
Pooja Expenses
Less Honorarium paid to Brahmins
Actual pooja expenses
5% of the total receipts
1
2012-13
1035551
54688
15325
39363
51778
2
2011-12
854469
54145
13900
40245
42723
3
2010-11
907408
52079
14165
37914
45370

9. Referring to the above chart she submitted that the Honorarium paid to the Brahmins is not the expenditure of the assessee but is the expenditure of the person visiting the temple. It is the administrative facility provided to the visitors. Therefore, if the same is excluded from the pooja expenses, then the expenditure of pooja expenses is less than the 5% of the total receipts. She accordingly submitted that both factually and legally the assessee is entitled to get the benefit of section 80G(5). She also relied on the decision of the Nagpur Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Shiv Mandir Devastan Panch Committee Sanstan Vs. CIT reported in 150 TTJ 452 (Nagpur).
10. The Ld. Departmental Representative on the other hand strongly supported the order of the CIT. He submitted that the activities of the assessee trust are religious in nature. The objects of the trust are mixed. However, the Brahmins have been employed for pooja etc. for and on behalf of the Devasthan. Therefore, the expenses of Honorarium to the Brahmins cannot be excluded from the pooja expenses. He accordingly submitted that the order of the CIT being in order should be upheld.
11. We have considered the rival arguments made by both the sides, perused the order of the Ld. CIT and the Paper Book filed on behalf of the assessee. We have also considered the various decisions cited before us. We find the Ld. CIT in the instant case rejected the application for grant of approval u/s.80G on the ground that the objects as well as activities of the trust are predominantly religious and the assessee trust has violated the provisions of sub-section (5B) of section 80G by incurring religious/pooja expenses in excess of 5% of the total receipts of the concerned year.
12. It is the submission of the Ld. Counsel for the assessee that the assessee is not a religious trust at all and the assessee does not propagate any particular religion. Further, it is also the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the assessee that the Honorarium paid to the Brahmins is not expenditure of the assessee but is the expenditure of the persons visiting the temple and it is the administrative facility provided to the visitors. Therefore, if the same is excluded from the pooja expenses then the expenditure of pooja expenses is less than 5% of the total receipts.
13. We find some merit in the arguments advanced by the Ld. Counsel for the assessee. Nowhere it has been brought out by the Ld. CIT that the assessee does propagate any particular religion and it is meant only for a particular religious community. The submission of the Ld. Counsel for the assessee that the appellant trust does not pertain to any particular sect and the temple is open for everyone irrespective of religion, caste, creed or sect could not be controverted by the Ld. Departmental Representative. Further, the Ld. CIT has also given a finding that the trust deed has a few charitable objects also. When the main source of the income of the assessee trust is pooja and utsavs and the income is used for maintenance of the temple building, the salary paid to the Brahmins, in our opinion, should not be considered as part of pooja expenses under the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, if the same is excluded from the pooja expenses, the total expenditure on pooja/religious activities will not exceed 5% of the total receipts of the assessee trust as per the chart at para 8 of this order. Further, it is also to be noted that the temple is owned by the Government of Maharashtra to perform pooja of Lord Aryanashwar and to celebrate various utsavs and the trust has also been registered u/s.12A of the I. T. Act.
14. We find the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of Umain Charitable Trust Vs. Union of India reported in 307 ITR 226 has observed as under (Short notes) :
“The line of distinction between religious purposes and charitable purposes is very thin and no watertight compartment between the two activities can be established. Unless the objective of the charitable trust in question itself is to spend its income for a particular religion and it is so found in the trust deed, the Income-tax Department cannot reject the renewal of the trust as charitable trust under section 80G of the Incometax Act, 1961, merely because one particular expenditure is for an activity which may be termed as spending for a particular religion.
A certificate was granted approving the petitioner-trust under section 80G for a period from April 1, 2001, to March 31, 2004. On an application for renewal of the approval in the prescribed form, the Commissioner held that the trust was not entitled to approval on the ground that it had incurred expenditure exceeding five per cent, of its total income of the year 2004 on a particular religion. On a writ petition against the refusal to renew the approval.
Held, allowing the petition, that there was no clause in the petitioner's trust deed which indicated that income of the petitioner-trust was to k applied wholly or substantially for any particular religion. Nothing had been pointed out in the order of the Commissioner that the petitionertrust had been constantly spending money for a particular religion. A single contribution by the charitable trust to another trust which carried out repair and renovation of Lord Vishnu's temple did not disentitle the petitioner-trust from renewal of its exemption certificate under section 80G. The repair and renovation of the temple did not necessarily mean that the expenditure in question was for a particular religion only. All people who have faith In Lord Vishnu's temple belong to different sects and have faith in different religions and also visit such temple of Lord Vishnu. The Revenue had not shown that entry to the temple was restricted to persons of one particular community or sect practising one religion. Hinduism is not one particular religion and different sects following Hindu philosophy do visit temples of the Lord Vishnu, be they Jains, Sikhs, Brahmins, etc. There is no watertight compartment between different castes or sects following one particular religion. Right to freedom of religion is guaranteed in the Constitution under article 25. Therefore, the Revenue could not take such a pedantic and narrow approach that the character of the charitable trust was lost if one particular expenditure was made for repair and renovation of Lord Vishnu's temple and that too by way of contribution to another trust. Therefore, the order of the Commissioner was set aside and the petitioner-trust shall be deemed to be registered under section 80G throughout the period after April I, 2004, with all consequential benefits.
15. Since in the instant case the objects of the trust are not entirely religious and since some of the objects are charitable in nature, a finding given by the Ld. CIT himself and since the temple is open to everybody irrespective of caste, creed, sect, colour etc. and since there is no restriction of entry of any particular community and since it has been held that if the Honorarium paid to the Brahmins of the assessee trust is excluded, then there is no violation of the provisions of sub-section 5B of section 80G, therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the assessee trust in the instant case should not be denied the benefit of grant of approval u/s.80G of the I. T. Act. We accordingly set aside the order of the CIT and direct him to grant approval u/s.80G of the I. T. Act. We hold and direct accordingly. The grounds raised by the assessee are accordingly allowed.
16. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.

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